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Inter-regional competition, especially the fiscal Competition among different 
local governments, is not only the focus of Public Economics, but also the hot topic of 
Urban and Regional Economics. This study is not only of great theoretical 
significance, but also of a more practical matter of urgency to the economic transation 
and economic development of china as well as explaining China's future economic 
development .  
It has been 30 years since the Reform and Opening up of China, economy 
decentralization , as well as financial decentralization and political decentralization 
have been put into practice. China has being one of the countries who enjoy the 
highest level of financial decentralization, by taking the meatures of “Fenzaochifan”             
in 1980and “Fenshuizhi” in 1994. Besides, local governments play dominant roles in 
the regions' economic developments. However, in politics, the performance reviews 
and appiontments of local officials are highly concentralised, these special 
mechanisms put critical influences on economic growth modes and the efficiency of 
local public finance. The success of china’s financial decentralization lies in the 
effective incentives to local governments to develop local economies. Unlike foreign 
countries, political incentives of the central government, centring performance 
appraisal make China's financial competition takes on a race-to-the-top form. 
The most significant perform of financial decentralization and political 
decentralization can be seen in the yardstick competition among different local 
governments. Empirical analysis is used in this paper to analyse the yardstick 
competition among local governments. Taking the methods of  spatial-econometric 
analysis, this paper aims to study yardstick competition among different local 
governments from the aspects of fiscal revenue and expenditure, according to the data 
coming from 28 provinces of China , during the period from 1986 to 2005.  
It was found that there is yardstick competition on fiscal expenditure among 
different local governments of China , according to the research: a 10% increase of  















expenditure in its neighboring  regions . 
As to the revenue, whenever there is a 10% increase in one region , financial 
revenue in its neighboring regions increase by 1％. 
This kind of yardstick competition is mainly due to the unique fiscal 
decentralization system of China. 
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① 引自Tiebout, C.M. 1956年发表的《A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures》. 
② 引自 Stiglers. G.1957 年的著作《Tenable Range of Functiona of Local government》. 
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